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Abstract
Individuals wishing to get married have made increasing use of matchmakers. This
notwithstanding, economists have paid scant attention to the strategies employed by
matchmakers and to the likelihood of success arising from the use of these strategies.
Consequently, we first specify a “local” and then a “global” strategy for matching male and
female clients and then we compute the expected total cost to a matchmaker from the use of
these strategies. Next, we calculate the mean number of successes that our matchmaker can
hope for. Finally, we provide an upper bound on the probability that the number of matching
successes is at least 1+ ¸ times the mean number, where ¸ is any positive number.
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In the rest of this paper, we suppose that our matchmaker is a single male individual. Even so, we recognize that the matchmaker
may be a single female individual or even a firm. In this regard, the point to note is that except for minor stylistic changes, nothing
in our analysis is altered by accounting for these last two possibilities.
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Arranged marriages have traditionally been more popular in the East than in the West. As
pointed out by Blood (1960), Moore (1994), Batabyal (2001), and Batabyal and Beladi (2002), in
arranged marriages, it is common to use matchmakers.
1 Matchmakers typically meet friends, family
members, and increasingly the individuals wishing to get married, and they then attempt to pair male
and female candidates with similar aspirations, goals, and interests. Clearly, the matchmaker’s
objective is to ensure that the paired individuals do in fact get married and that this marriage lasts for
an appreciable amount of time. It is important to note that matchmaking activities are fundamentally
prospective; further, all matchmakers operate in inherently stochastic environments.
Until recently, most marrying individuals in the West took upon themselves the task of finding
a suitable mate. Consequently, matchmaking activities in general were rather limited. However, in the
past two decades, owing to a variety of reasons not the least of which is a general lack of time, this
state of affairs has changed substantially. As a result, today, even in the West, it is quite common to
find a plethora of matchmakers advertising their services in newspapers and on the internet.
2 Given
the traditional use of matchmakers in the East and the increasing popularity of matchmakers in the
West, a number of interesting questions about the activities of these matchmakers emerge. Examples
of such questions include the following. What are the properties of alternate matchmaking strategies?
Given a particular matching strategy, what is the expected number of successes that a matchmaker
can hope for? Finally, given a desired number of successes, is it possible to make a mathematically
precise statement about the probability that the number of matching successes will be at least the
desired number? Although these questions are both thought-provoking and relevant, unfortunately,
economists have paid virtually no attention to them. 
Quah (1990) has discussed the phenomenon of matchmaking but the basic focus of his paper
is on analyzing the factors influencing the age at first marriage. More recently, Van Raalte and
Webers (1998) have studied a two-sided market in which one type of agent needs the services of a
matchmaker in order to be matched to the other type. In this setting, these authors analyze a scenario
in which matchmakers compete for agents of both types by means of commission fees. Finally, in a
model of two-sided search, Bloch and Ryder (2000) have shown that when a matchmaker charges
a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized matching
procedure. In contrast, if the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, then only
agents of lower quality go to this intermediary. Although these papers have certainly advanced our
understanding of issues related to matchmaking, nonetheless, the questions mentioned in the previous3
These strategies are variants of the so-called “greedy algorithms.” For more on these algorithms and related issues such as the
assignment problem, see Winston (1997) and Ross (2000, 2002).
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paragraph remain unanswered.
Consequently, our paper has two objectives. First, we specify two desirable strategies—the
“local” strategy and the “global” strategy—for matching male and female clients and then we compute
the expected total cost to a matchmaker from the use of each of these strategies.
3 Next, we calculate
the expected number of matching successes that a matchmaker can hope for and then we provide an
upper bound on the probability that the number of matching successes is at least   times the mean 1%θ
number, where   is any positive number. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 θ
describes the theoretical framework and the two matchmaking strategies that comprise the subject
of this paper. Section 3 computes the average total cost to a matchmaker from the use of each of
these strategies. Section 4 calculates the mean number of matching successes and then it shows how
the upper bound discussed above can be derived. Section 5 concludes and discusses avenues for
further research on the subject of this paper. 
2. The Theoretical Framework
Consider a matchmaker who has a number of male and female clients who wish to get
married. Specifically, there are   male and   female clients and our matchmaker’s job is to match nn
each male client to one and only one female client. Now, the task of matching male and female clients
involves the expenditure of some—and possibly considerable—effort on the part of the matchmaker.
Put differently, every time the matchmaker assigns a male client to a female client, he incurs a cost.
To this end, let   be the cost incurred by our matchmaker when he matches male client   to c(j,k) j
female client    k, j,k'1,...,n.
Clearly, there are many possible strategies that our matchmaker could use to carry out the task
of assigning each male client to one female client. However, to fix ideas, we shall consider the
following two desirable strategies in this paper. The first or “local” matching strategy works as
follows. The matchmaker begins by assigning male client 1 to the female client that results in the
lowest cost to him. In other words, male client 1 is matched with female client   where k1,
 Female client   is then removed from further consideration. Then, the c(1,k1)'min{k}c(1,k). k1
matchmaker assigns male client 2 to female client   so that   The matchmaker k2 c(2,k2)'min{k…k1}c(2,k).
continues in this manner until all male and female clients have been matched. This local strategy is
desirable because it always selects the best female match for the male client currently under
consideration.
Our matchmaker’s second desirable strategy is a “global” version of the previous paragraph’s
local strategy. Using this global strategy, the matchmaker first considers all   cost values and he n 2
selects the pair   for which his cost   is minimal. The matchmaker then matches male client  (j1,k1) c(j,k) j1
to female client   Next, he eliminates from further consideration all cost values that involve either k1.
male client   or female client   As a result,   cost values now remain and our matchmaker j1 k1.( n&1)2
continues the process of selecting pairs and then matching as just described. Put differently, at every4
See Ross (2000, p. 250; 2002, p. 36) for additional details on this point.
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stage, he chooses the male and the female clients that result in the lowest cost among all the
unmatched male and female clients. We have already explained why the previous paragraph’s local
strategy is desirable. Simply put, this global strategy is desirable because it is a more thorough version
of the local strategy. Our task now is to compute the average total cost incurred by our matchmaker
when he uses each of these two strategies.
3. The Local and the Global Expected Total Costs
As indicated in section 1, our matchmaker operates in a stochastic environment. To model
this aspect of the problem, we let all the cost values   comprise a set of independent random c(j,k)
variables. Now, when analyzing greedy type algorithms, it is common to work with exponential
random variables.
4 Consequently, in the remainder of this section, we suppose that the   cost values n 2
 constitute a set of independent, exponentially distributed random variables with rate  c(j,k) β.
3.1. The Local Expected Total Cost
Given that our matchmaker is using the local strategy, let   denote the cost associated c(j,@)
with matching male client   It should be clear to the reader that   is the minimum of  j, j'1,...,n. c(1,@) n
independent exponential random variables, each of which has rate   Hence, using equation 5.6 in β.
Ross (2000, p. 249), it follows that   is itself exponentially distributed with rate   Similarly,  c(1,@) βn. c(2,@)
is the minimum of   independent exponential random variables with rate   and hence   is n&1 β c(2,@)
exponentially distributed with rate   Continuing in this manner we can tell that   is β(n&1). c(j,@)
exponentially distributed with rate β(n&j%1), j'1,...,n.
Using the above information, we conclude that the expected total cost to the matchmaker
when he uses the local strategy,   is El[total cost],
(1) El[total cost]'E[c(1,@)%...%c(j,@)%...%c(n,@)]'El[c(1,@)]%...%El[c(j,@)]%...%El[c(n,@)].
Now, using the properties of the exponential distribution, the   expectations on the right-hand-side n
(RHS) of equation (1) can be simplified. This simplification yields














The RHS of equation (2) gives us the expected total cost to our matchmaker when he uses
the local strategy to match his male and female clients. We see that this cost is the product of the
mean of the exponentially distributed cost values and a summation term. We now compute our
matchmaker’s average total cost when he uses the global strategy.5
For more on this, see Ross (2000, pp. 243-245; 2002, p. 33).
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3.2. The Global Expected Total Cost
Let   be the cost of the   male-female pair matched by this global strategy. Because c(j,@) jth
 is the minimum of all the   cost values, using equation 5.6 in Ross (2000, p. 249) we c(1,@) n 2 c(j,k)
can tell that   is exponentially distributed with rate   Now, because exponentially distributed c(1,@) βn 2.
random variables have the memoryless property,
5 we reason that the amounts by which the other
 exceed   will be independent and exponentially distributed random variables with rates  c(j,k) c(1,@) β.
Hence,   equals the sum of   and the minimum of   independent exponentials with c(2,@) c(1,@)( n&1)2
rate   Similarly,   is equal to the sum of   and the minimum of   independent β. c(3,@) c(2,@)( n&2)2
exponentials with rate   and so on. β,
Now, using the above reasoning and the properties of exponentially distributed random
variables, we infer that     and E[c(1,@)]'1/(βn 2), E[c(2,@)]'E[c(1,@)]%1/{β(n&1)2},
 Continuing this line of reasoning, we get E[c(3,@)]'E[c(2,@)]%1/{β(n&2)2}.
 and finally   These expressions for E[c(k,@)]'E[c(k&1,@)]%1/{β(n&k%1)2} E[c(n,@)]'E[c(n&1,@)]%1/β.
the various cost expectations can be simplified even further. This simplification yields
   and  eventually E[c(1,@)]'1/(βn 2), E[c(2,@)]'1/(βn 2)%1/{β(n&1)2},
E[c(n,@)]'1/(βn 2)%1/{β(n&1)2}%...%1/β.
Using the above computations, we conclude that the expected total cost to our matchmaker
when he uses the global strategy,   is Eg[total cost],























Inspecting equations (2) and (4), it is clear that we have just established
THEOREM 1: The expected total cost to our matchmaker is the same for both strategies.
Theorem 1 contains a rather surprising result. Specifically, this theorem tells us that it does
not matter which strategy our matchmaker uses because both strategies lead to the same total
expected cost. Intuitively, one expects greater thoroughness on the part of the matchmaker to
increase his costs. However, in the setting of this paper, this is not the case. Having said this, the
reader should note that greater painstakingness does not, however, result in a lower expected total6
See Ross (2000, pp. 27-28; 2002, pp. 6-7) for more on Bernoulli random variables.
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cost. Consequently, from the standpoint of the expected total cost criterion, our matchmaker will be
indifferent between the local and the global strategies.
What is the expected number of successes that our matchmaker can hope for from either
strategy? Moreover, given a desired number of successes, is it possible to say something
mathematically precise about the probability that the number of matching successes is at least the
desired number? We now address these two questions.
4. Success in Matching: Two Questions
Before we proceed any further with the above two questions we must first delineate the
meaning of a success. Recall that the whole point of matchmaking is to ensure that marriages
eventually take place. Consequently, in what follows, we shall say that a match is a success if it leads
to marriage within   time periods. The actual value of   will typically vary from society to society TT
and, ceteris paribus, we expect   to be shorter in Eastern societies than in Western societies. This T
notwithstanding, it is clear that there has to be a temporal dimension to the meaning of success.
Moreover, it is also clear that for it to be interesting, an analysis of the “expected number of matching
successes” question must be conducted from an ex ante perspective and not   time periods after the  Tn
male-female pairings have been made.
4.1. The Expected Number of Successes
Suppose that our matchmaker observes the   matches that he has just made. Also suppose n
that our matchmaker’s skill is such that the probability that each match is a success (will lead to
marriage in   time periods) is   What is the expected number of successes? To answer this Tp 0(0,1).
question, it is useful to think of the   matches as   independent Bernoulli random variables.
6 Now, nn
let   denote the number of successes from   matches. Then, using the properties of Bernoulli S(n) n
random variables, we see that 
(5) E[S(n)]'np.
In words, the average number of successes is given by the product of the number of matches
and the success probability of each match. Inspecting equation (5), it is clear that holding the number
of matches fixed, the expected number of successes is an increasing function of the success probability
 Similarly, keeping the success probability   fixed, as we increase the number of matches, the p. p
expected number of successful matches rises. Let us now address the question about the probability
that the number of matching successes is at least some desired number.7
This bound is also called the Chernoff bound. See Ross (2002, pp. 76-78) for additional details.
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4.2. Computing the Upper Bound
From section 4.1 we know that the expected number of matching successes is   Now given np.
this expected number, suppose that our matchmaker desires a certain number of successes. We would
like to make a mathematically precise statement about the probability that the actual number of
successes is at least the desired number times the expected number of successes    np.
To address this question, let us begin by letting   be any positive number. Further, suppose θ>0
that our matchmaker’s desired number of successes is   times the expected number of successes. 1%θ
We will now provide an upper bound
7 on the probability that the desired number of successes is 1%θ
times the expected number of successes. Using corollary 3.1.2 in Ross (2002, p. 77), we see that
(6) Prob{S(n)&E[S(n)]$θE[S(n)]}#exp{&2(θE[S(n)])2/n}.
Because  the RHS of inequality (6) can be simplified. This gives E[S(n)]'np,
(7) Prob{S(n)&E[S(n)]$θE[S(n)]}#exp{&2n(pθ)2}.
In words, the probability that the number of matching successes is at least   times the 1%θ
expected number of successes   is bounded above by the exponential term on the RHS of inequality np
(7). In particular, this probability is at most as large as the reciprocal of the exponential raised to
 Inspecting inequality (7) we see that holding the number of matches   and the success 2n(pθ)2. n
probability   fixed, the probability of interest decreases to zero exponentially fast as   increases. This p θ
tells us that if we use the expected number of successes   as our benchmark, then there is a tradeoff np
between a higher desired number of matching successes and the probability that these desired
successes will in fact materialize.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed three hitherto unstudied questions about the nature of decision
making in marital matchmaking. First, we established the counterintuitive result (see Theorem 1) that
the local and the global strategies both lead to the same expected total cost to our matchmaker.
Second, we showed that the expected number of successes that our matchmaker can hope for is given
by the product of the number of matches   and the success probability   Finally, we pointed out that np .
given a desired number of matching successes, it is possible to provide an upper bound on the
probability that the actual number of successes is at least this desired number.
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we
suggest two possible extensions. First, in section 3, we studied the expected total cost to our
matchmaker resulting from the use of local and global strategies. Although these strategies are7
desirable in the sense indicated in section 3, it would nonetheless be useful to determine the set of
matches that minimizes the sum of the   costs that are incurred. n
Second, it would also be useful to study the matchmaking function within the context of a
model of common agency. In such a model, the matchmaker would be the common agent serving two
principals, namely, a representative male client and a representative female client. An analysis of these
aspects of the problem will allow richer analyses of the nexuses between alternate pairing strategies
and the outcome of matchmaking in stochastic environments.8
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